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his points, whether original or borrowed, Mr. Ballantine is concise and clear. Altogether, the book is well adapted to intermediate academic instruction, although at the particular elementary stage of the educational course for which it is most suitable, most pupils have not yet attained a scientific grasp and breadth of vision which makes such a study a profitable undertaking. Into the author's points of logical doctrine we cannot enter. μκρκ.

BUDDHISM IN TRANSLATIONS. By *Henry Clarke Warren*. Cambridge: Harvard University. 1896. Pages, 520. Price, \$1.20.

Mr. Henry Clarke Warren's book on Buddhism, will at once take a prominent place among Buddhistic publications. It is the first systematic collection of original translations from the southern canon of Buddhistic Scriptures, including not only passages of those books which have become accessible through the translations of other Pali scholars, but also new materials, for instance, selections from the *Vissuddhimagga* which had to be translated from manuscripts.

While Mr. Warren's book is to be recommended as an indispensable *vade-mecum* to all those who for one reason or another are interested in Buddhism, we must here state at once that the uninitiated will, naturally and necessarily, encounter great difficulties, for to appreciate the book one ought to understand the conditions under which Buddhism originated and the significance of the terms *âtman*, *karma*, *nirvâna*, etc., not only in their etymologies and definitions but also in their emotional potencies. *Nirvâna* may correctly be translated by extinction, but the word extinction does not find that same echo in our souls as *nirvâna* does in the souls of Buddhists to whom it is identical with a radical extinction of evil, sin, iniquity, pain, passion, hatred, and selfishness, which is regarded as the establishment of the highest bliss imaginable. *Nirvâna* corresponds to the Christian "heaven," yet it would be a mistake to translate it by the word "heaven"; for that which is commonly thought of when we speak of heaven, an eternal jubilee and glorification of God, would not be regarded as the highest bliss by Buddhists. There may be, and there are, according to Buddhist conceptions, inhabitants of heaven who have not as yet attained *nirvâna*.

Mr. Warren has translated *âtman* by "ego," and sometimes by "self," and these words are the best rendering that can be found; but we must always bear in mind that *âtman* according to the definition of the Brahman philosophy in Buddha's days meant the "self" in the sense of an immutable, eternal soul-essence of man. The *âtman* was supposed to be that essential part of the soul which remains the same in all changes, and conditions the identity of a person; it was thought to be the soul itself, and was regarded as a distinct being, distinct from all faculties of the soul and distinct also from all soul-activity. Since Buddhism teaches that nothing is stable in this world, it naturally denies the existence of an *âtman*.

Buddhism, of course, does not deny the existence of an ego in the sense of the existence of self-consciousness. It only denies the metaphysical assumption that

the unity of man's self-consciousness implies that it is an immutable unit. Man's personality is by Buddha conceived as a compound, which as such is subject to the law of dissolution. While the existence of an *âtman* in the technical sense of the Brahman psychology is openly and squarely disavowed, the word *âtman* is nevertheless used in the common significance of "self." Thus we meet in the *Dharma-pada* with such passages as this: "Self is the Lord? Who else should be Lord?" (verse 160), and "a man who controls himself enters the untrodden land through his own self-controlled self" (verse 323). But this "self" is the conscious condition that is expressed in the words "I will," and not the eternal *âtman* of the Brahman sages, it means "self" as we use the word in common parlance.

The truth is reiterated that all things in this world are compounds, and compounds are subject to the law of dissolution. There is an absolute non-existence of an *âtman*, of a stable, immutable, soul-substance, and thus Buddhism naturally appears at first sight as nihilistic. It seems to deny all that which according to the usual conception of the soul seems to be of value, and we may wonder why Buddhism appeared acceptable to anybody. Here lies the difficulty of comprehending Buddhism, and even some of its best expounders have failed to understand it properly. Men like Oldenberg look upon Buddhism as an ill-concealed negativism, and when the Buddha refuses to answer certain questions, such as whether the saint will live on after death or be annihilated, Oldenberg believes that the Buddha shirks an answer because he fears to shock the weak-minded hearer who would not be able to stand the full truth which clearly pointed to the reply that a saint would be annihilated after death. Mr. Warren here sees deeper than Oldenberg. Mr. Warren declares in his introductory discourse to Chapter II. that all the questions which Buddha left unanswered touch problems which according to his doctrines were out of court, "for these questions take for granted what he denies, 'hence he refuses to give a Yes or No answer, just as any one of us might be excused for doing, in case any one were to be so impolite as to ask 'Have you left off beating your mother?' The truth of no one of these theories could be allowed. 'They are one and all heretical and incompatible with his doctrine.'"

Most palpable is this in a chapter taken from the *Digha-Nikaya*, § 67, pp. 310-311. Here a certain priest wants the question answered, "Where do these four elements, to-wit, the earthy element, the watery element, the fiery element, and the windy element, utterly cease?" He addresses all the sages, kings, and gods, until at last he comes to Brahma himself, and Brahma spoke to the priest as follows: "I, O priest, am Brahma, Great Brahma, the Supreme Being, the Unsurpassed, the Perceiver of All Things, the Controller, the Lord of All, the Maker, the Fashioner, the Chief, the Victor, the Ruler, the Father of All Beings Who Have Been and Are to Be."

The questioner not without a tinge of irony objects to this, saying: "My friend, I am not asking you, are you Brahma, Great Brahma, the Supreme Being, etc.? but I ask you 'Where do these four elements utterly cease?'" Brahma repeats his

self-glorifying speech three times, and then he takes the questioner by the arm, leads him aside, and speaks to him as follows :

"O priest, these gods of my suite believe as follows : 'Brahma sees all things ; knows all things ; has penetrated all things.' Therefore was it that I did not answer you in their presence. I, O priest, do not know where these four elements, to-wit, the earthy element, the watery element, the fiery element, and the windy element utterly cease. Therefore it was a sin and a crime, O priest, that you left the Blessed One, and went elsewhere in quest of an answer to this question. Turn back, O priest, and having drawn near to the Blessed One, ask him this question, and as the Blessed One shall explain unto you, so believe."

When the priest appears before the Blessed One, the latter says after some introductory remarks : "O priest, this question ought never to have been put thus, 'Reverend Sir, where do these four elements, to-wit, the earthy element, the watery element, the fiery element, and the windy element utterly cease?' But this, O priest, is how the question should have been put :

"O where doth water, where doth earth,
And fire, and wind no footing find ?
And where doth long, and where doth short
And fine and coarse and good and bad,
And where do name and form both cease,
And turn to utter nothingness ?

"And the answer is :

"In consciousness invisible
And infinite, of radiance bright,
O there doth water, there doth earth,
And fire and wind no footing find.
And there doth long, and there doth short,
And fine and coarse and good and bad,
And there do name and form both cease
And utter nothingness become.
And then, when consciousness hath ceased,
This all hath turned to nothingness."

Here Buddha directly states that the question "ought never to have been put thus," which means that the problem is wrongly formulated. The four elements do not utterly cease, but they only do not find a footing in him who has surrendered all attachment, who is free from desire, who has attained nirvâna.

The standpoint which Buddha assumes is so radically different from the standpoint of the Brahmans that their most important problems become irrelevant. The âtman does not exist, and therefore the attainment of nirvâna, consisting in the getting rid of illusion, is not an annihilation, for there is nothing to be annihilated. The reality of the world remains real as before. The first fault is that man thinks

of himself as an individual *âtman* which produces the fear of annihilation in death. The question whether man's self, his *âtman*, is annihilated in death or preserved, has no sense.

Buddha denies on the one hand the reality of an immutable being, of the *ὄντως ὄν* or Absolute Being such as it was conceived by the Eleatics, and on the other hand he denies the illusoriness of our experience and our deeds. Buddha is not an idealist in the sense that existence should be regarded as a sham. Avoiding the two extremes, he calls his doctrine the "middle doctrine."

But what is the reality that according to Buddha is real? Reality according to Buddha consists in the processes that are taking place, and the reality of living beings consists in their deeds. Reality is doing or acting, as the Germans call it *wirken*. Reality is *Wirklichkeit*. Buddha's doctrine is a strict monism. He does not divide the world into a creator and a creation, a doer and deeds, an enjoyer and enjoyment. Doing exists and the doer is a name given to the doing, as constituted by the groups of existence. There is *karma* but no *âtman*. Thus the world as it exists is a system of actions that are taking place, and every living being is the exact result of its own karma. The evil as well as the good is our own making, and of course every individual must be regarded as the present incorporation of a long history. It is the result of a development in previous lives. Individuals in the proper sense of the word, accordingly, do not exist. The individual as we conceive it is only a temporary incarnation of its own life-history, and it is this doctrine of deeds, or karma, which makes Buddhism so much akin to the theory of evolution.

The term "karma" has two meanings: first, it means deed, that is to say, the performance of definite actions, and then, the character which is constituted through deeds. Deeds leave traces and establish habits by repetition. They constitute what we call character, and while there is no *âtman* which transmigrates from one individual to another, there is a rebirth of character. The same characters appear again and again and perpetuate the species. In this way they constitute a conception which is not unlike the Christian idea of immortality. Mr. Warren says (p. 210): "It is the character of our friend, his particular set of deeds, or karma, that we think of as surviving death, and this is exactly what the Buddhists do,—the only difference being that we claim the existence of an ego. . . . The reader will see, I think, that the two doctrines are really very similar, if we but leave the postulation of an ego out of the question."

After these expositions we can explain what the Buddha regarded as the essence of our own being. Man has no right to call anything his own that he will lose again, not his property, not his family, not his slaves, not even his own body, and the present manifestations of his consciousness. His own consists in his karma, in the deeds which he performs, for they survive after death. This doctrine finds expression in the following verses:

"Nor grain, nor wealth, nor store of gold and silver,
Not one amongst his women-folk and children,

Nor slave, domestic, hired man,
 Nor any one that eats his bread,
 Can follow him who leaves this life,
 But all things must be left behind.

"But every deed a man performs,
 With body, or with voice, or mind,
 'Tis this that he can call his own,
 This with him take as he goes hence.
 This is what follows after him,
 And like a shadow ne'er departs.

"Let all, then, noble deeds perform,
 A treasure-store for future weal ;
 For merit gained this life within,
 Will yield a blessing in the next."

Buddha's doctrine is, in one word, anti-metaphysical. He denies the thing-in-itself, the *âtman*, the eternal, as a substance or entity. There is nothing permanent except the eternal truth that can be gained by enlightenment.

While Buddha's system was a definite philosophy which in spite of the many corruptions of the Pâli texts is in its outlines very clearly set forth, we cannot help admiring the practical spirit of the Great Teacher, the influence of which lasted for millenniums and will probably never be obliterated in his followers, even where they have degenerated and are in utter ignorance of the significance of his doctrines. Mr. Warren says of the Buddha in his introductory discourse to the first chapter : "In reading the Pâli Scriptures one is impressed with the strong personal influence exercised by the Buddha over the hearts of his followers. He was regarded not as a mere formulator of dry metaphysical propositions, but as a very wise and compassionate friend of his fellow-men. He was full of tact, and all his ways were ways of peace. To allay discord he would tell a little story or fable with a moral, and his epithet for one of whom he disapproved was merely 'vain man.' Anger, in fact, had no place in his character, and the reader of this book will find that it had equally none in his religio-philosophic system." P. C.

BHAKTI SATAKA. By *Râma Chandrabhârati*. With a Commentary by the *Rev. C. A. Seelakkhandha Thera*. Darjeeling : Buddhist Text Society of India. 1896.

The *Bhakti Sataka*, or "Hundred Lines of Faith," written in the beginning of the thirteenth century A. D. by Sri Râma Chandrabhârati, a pupil of Sri Rahula Sangha Raja, illustrates the virtues of the Buddha. The Rev. C. A. Seelakkhandha, of the Sailabimbarama Vihara at Dodauduwa, Ceylon, has undertaken to edit the *Bhakti Sataka* with a commentary, trusting that on account of its excellent style and the information it contains on Buddhism the poem will prove a very useful Sanskrit Reader for beginners.